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The Misappropriation Theory:
Overextension Of Liability In Section 10(b)
Causes Of Action
I. Introduction
At the onset, securities were regulated primarily by the states.1
However, after the stock market crash in 1929, Congress soon
initiated securities regulations. 2 As part of President Roosevelt's
New Deal, the Securities Act of 19333 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 19344 (the 1934 Act) were enacted. Section 10(b) of the
1934 Act was designed to prohibit manipulative and deceptive
devices5 employed in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
6
1. "A generation of state legislation and centuries of legislation in England" preceded
the federal regulation of securities. LOUIS LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURrrmS
REGULATION 1 (2d ed. 1988).
2. "When the Crash of 1929, followed by the Great Depression, finally led to the
passage of the Securities Act of 1933 during the 'glorious days' of President Roosevelt's New
Deal, the first problem was determining what the role of the federal government should be
in the protection of investors." Id. at 25.
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a 77bbbb (1995).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1995).
5. Manipulation has been defined as such practices as wash sales, matched orders or
rigged prices which are designed to deceive investors by artificially affecting market activity
or controlling securities prices. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976). The
Court basically defined a deceptive device as the making of a material misstatement or
omission. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164 (1994).
6. Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1934) provides
in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
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However, Section 10(b) was not self-operative. It would
become operative only upon a rule promulgated pursuant to the
powers of the Securities Exchange Commission.7 Hence, Rule 10b-
58 was promulgated in 1942 pursuant to this power.
Violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 could result in both
civil and criminal liability.9 Historically, an action for violation of
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 was brought through a "traditional"
theory of liability.10 This theory hinged on the failure of an
insider1  to disclose material12 nonpublic information before the
culmination of a securities transaction when there was a duty to do
7. Rule lOb-5 was adopted pursuant to authority granted the [Securities and Exchange]
Commission under § 10(b). The rulemaking power granted to an administrative agency
charged with the administration of a federal statute is not the power to make law. Rather,
it is "'the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed
by the statute. .. .' [The scope of the Rule] cannot exceed the power granted the
Commission under Section 10(b)." Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472-473
(1977) (quoting Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 212-14 (1976)).
8. Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, provides:
Employment of manipulative or deceptive devices.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of conduct which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
9. "While both sections are criminal in nature, it is well settled that they create an
implied right of action." A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 396 (2d Cir. 1967).
10. Two elements that have traditionally been present are:
(i) the existence of a relationship affording access to inside information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose, and
(ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that
information by trading without disclosure.
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980) (quoting In Re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907, 912, n.15 (1961)). See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991);
SEC v. Dirks, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.
1968).
11. "Traditionally corporate insiders are officers, directors, or controlling shareholder."
In Re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 11 (1961).
12. "Material information is that which may affect the desire of investors to buy, sell,
or hold a corporations securities." Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 849. Material
information has also been defined as information that would have actual significance in the
deliberations of a reasonable shareholder. Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir.
1985).
MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
so. This duty was contingent upon a relationship between the
person trading on the inside information, the insider and the
shareholder in the transaction. t3
The misappropriation theory of liability also arose from
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-
5. This theory premises liability on a violation of Rule 10b-5 when
a person misappropriates material nonpublic information and uses
that information in a securities transaction in breach of a fiduciary
duty or similar relationship of trust and confidence. 4 The misap-
propriation theory has been advanced and accepted in four
circuits; 5 however, the Supreme Court has yet to directly rule on
this theory.
16
The misappropriation theory has been criticized for the
problems and uncertainty of its application. 7  Although the
Supreme Court has not directly endorsed the misappropriation
theory, it has determined the proper interpretation of Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 under
circumstances analogous to those underlying the misappropriation
theory. 8 A review of the Supreme Court's holdings leads to the
inexorable conclusion that the lower courts have perverted the
original intent of the 1934 legislation through their tenuous
interpretation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.19 Using a strict
statutory construction, the misappropriation theory is an invalid
13. "The predicate act of fraud must be traceable to a breach of duty to the purchasers
or sellers of securities." United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 565-66 (2d Cir. 1991).
14. Id. at 566.
15. SEC v. Ladavac, 51 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596
(2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc); SEC v.
Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990); Rothberg
v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1985); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984);
Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d
12 (2d Cir. 1981), affd after remand, 722 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1983). Although Rothberg did
not explicitly adopt the misappropriation theory, its citation to Newman implies at least its
tacit acceptance of the theory.
16. In Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19,24 (1987), the Court was evenly divided
on the securities convictions based on the misappropriation theory and therefore affirmed
the convictions of the lower court.
17. "It would be difficult to overstate the uncertainty that has been introduced into the
already uncertain law governing fraudulent securities transactions through adoption of the
misappropriation theory, with its linchpin the breach of a fiduciary duty." United States v.
Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 951 (4th Cir. 1995).
18. See Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164
(1994); Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. 185
(1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
19. See supra note 18.
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extension of Section 10(b) through Rule 10b-5.' Therefore, the
misappropriation theory cannot withstand the scrutiny that the
Supreme Court is presently applying to Section 10(b) litigation.
This view in opposition to the misappropriation theory was
most recently expressed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.2
The eighth circuit completely adopted the reasoning of the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, which declared that the misappropriation
theory has no foundation in law.22 In United States v. Bryan,'
the fourth circuit stated that the misappropriation theory can not
be reconciled with the language and purposes of Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5. 4 This view is further strengthened by the fact that a
petition for certiorari was not filed from the fourth circuit case.
This leads to the inference that the Securities Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) does not want to "tip the boat" that it has managed to
float for the last fifteen years.' The SEC seems content to lose
the small battles in the circuits where it generally does not bring
many securities law violations actions because at present it is
winning the war. The misappropriation theory is firmly entrenched
in the second circuit, where most securities actions are brought.26
However, most recently the eighth circuit in O'Hagan adopted the
totality of the fourth circuit's reasoning rejecting the misappropria-
tion theory. As the rift between the circuits continues to widen,
hopefully another opportunity for clarification of Section 10(b) will
not be lost.
The purpose of this Comment is to demonstrate that the
misappropriation theory is truly an erroneous extension of Section
10(b). This view does not indicate that the Author believes that
the securities market should not be extensively regulated in order
to maintain an honest and level playing field. Rather, this view
calls for a clarification of the securities law either by legislation, a
Supreme Court interpretation, or a Supreme Court interpretation
that spurs legislation.
20. Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164.
21. United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996).
22. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 944 (4th Cir. 1995).
23. 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
24. Id. at 943.
25. The Second Circuit explicitly adopted the misappropriation theory in 1981. United
States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d cir. 1981).
26. See Elkan Abramowitz, A Lost Opportunity to Clarify Law on Insider Trading, N.Y.
LAW J., Nov. 7, 1995, Tuesday, at 3.
[Vol. 101:2
MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
This Comment will demonstrate that the adoption of the
misappropriation theory by the majority of circuit courts that have
considered the issue is misplaced and distorted. In addition, the
present interpretation of Section 10(b) by the circuit courts is
incongruent with the intentions of the 1934 Congress and the
current Supreme Court instructions as to Section 10(b) statutory
interpretation. Therefore, the fourth circuit was correct when it
rejected the misappropriation theory as having no foundation in
law.
In order to support this proposition Part II of this Comment
will examine the history of the origin and development of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Next, the proper interpretation of Section
10(b) as determined by the Supreme Court will be discussed. The
development of the misappropriation theory will be traced from its
inception in Justice Burger's dissent in Chiarella v. United States,
27
through its development in the second circuit and the other circuits
that have adopted the theory. Part II will then demonstrate how
the Supreme Court has managed to avoid deciding on the misap-
propriation theory. Part II will culminate with a discussion of the
fourth circuit's rejection of the misappropriation theory.
Part III will begin with the reasoning behind the fourth
circuit's rejection of the misappropriation theory. The background
and facts of the particular case rejecting the misappropriation
theory will be discussed. An analysis of the misappropriation
theory will follow. This Comment will then demonstrate that
through strict statutory construction, as most recently defined by
the Supreme Court, the misappropriation theory is an invalid
extension of Section 10(b). Further, it will be shown that the
misappropriation theory lacks the certainty and predictability that
are so necessary in securities regulations and in the application of
penal sanctions. Towards that end, the special meaning of "fraud"
in the securities context will be examined. The tenuousness of the
application of the misappropriation theory in relation to the
language of Section 10(b) will also be examined to undermine the
validity of the theory. It will be suggested that the rejection of the
misappropriation theory will not adversely affect the marketplace.
The rejection of the misappropriation theory fits into the Supreme
Court's trend of strictly interpreting federal securities regulations.
This Comment will propose a revision of Rule 10b-5 that would
27. 445 U.S. 222, 239 (1980).
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eliminate the misappropriation theory of liability. This proposal
would be more in conformity with the Congressional intent behind
Section 10(b). The proposal would protect brokers and investors
and would limit liability solely to the traditional theory.
In Part IV, this Comment will conclude that the misappropri-
ation theory is an invalid judicial extension of Section 10(b) and
must be abolished. Part IV will further advocate a change to Rule
10b-5 to give the certainty and predictability that is needed in
determining liability under Section 10(b).
II. History
A. Genesis of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
The roots of the misappropriation theory trace back to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [1934 Act]. 8  This act was
primarily designed to protect investors from the manipulation of
stock prices by regulating transactions on the securities exchan-
ges.
29
Congress designed Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act as an
omnibus provision to guard against manipulative and deceptive
devices practiced at the time and any that would arise in the
future.30 However, Section 10(b) is only operational upon a rule
promulgated pursuant to the powers of the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC). 1 The SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 in 1942
which prohibited the use of manipulative and deceptive devices.
B. Proper Statutory Interpretation of Section 10(b) Divined from
the Supreme Court
Because the misappropriation theory arises from Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5, it is important first to analyze the proper statutory
interpretation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as delineated by the
Supreme Court.
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78bbbb.
29. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 1-5 (1933).
30. "Though shalt not devise any other cunning devices." Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS
OF SECURITIES REGULATION 726, (2d ed. 1988) (quoting Stock Exchange Regulation Hearing
Before House Committee on International and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d sess., 115
(1934) (statement of Thomas G. Corcoran)).
31. See supra note 7.
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Most recently in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver,32 the Supreme Court overturned existing
securities law interpretations within the circuits by eliminating a
private cause of action for aiding and abetting in violation of Rule
10b-5. a3 The Court found that Section 10(b) prohibits only the
making of a material misstatement or omission or the commission
of a manipulative act. 4 Section 10(b) does not prohibit the giving
of aid to one who commits the manipulative or deceptive act.35
This is the most recent decision in a trend of restrictive interpreta-
tions of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
In Central Bank of Denver,6 the Colorado Springs-Stetson
Hills Public Building Authority issued bonds to finance public
improvements at a planned residential and commercial develop-
ment.37  Central Bank served as indenture trustee for the
bonds.3" These bonds were secured by landowner assessment
liens.39 The covenant required that the land subject to the lien be
worth at least 160% of the bonds' outstanding principal and
interest amount. 4 The developer was to provide Central Bank
with an annual report demonstrating that the 160% requirement
was fulfilled.41 Upon reviewing the report, the underwriter wrote
to Central Bank expressing concern as to falling real estate prices
in the area and that Central Bank was operating on appraisal
values over sixteen months old.42 Consequently, Central Bank's in-
house appraiser reviewed the updated appraisal and concluded that
the figures were rather optimistic.43 He suggested that an outside
appraisal be independently conducted; however, after an exchange
32. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
33. 511 U.S. at 191.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 177.
36. Section 104 of The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L 104-67,
109 Stat. 737 (1995), overruled Central Bank of Denver. See SEC v. Fehn, No. 94-16136,
1996 WL 577833 (9th Cir. Oct. 9, 1996). The Securities Reform Act of 1995 overruled
Central Bank of Denver solely for purposes of SEC enforcement. ARTHUR F. MATrHEWS
ET AL., LAW AND BusINEss INSIGHTS, THE 1995 AND EARLY 1996 SEC ENFORCEMENT
REVIEW: PART I (June 1996).









of letters between Central Bank and the developer, Central Bank
agreed to delay the appraisal until the end of the year." The
Authority defaulted on these bonds before the independent review
was completed.45
As a result of the default, First Interstate, a bondholder, sued
the Authority, the underwriter, a junior underwriter, a developer's
director and Central Bank for violations of Section 10(b). 46 First
Interstate alleged that Central Bank was secondarily liable for its
conduct in aiding and abetting the fraud.47 In response to these
allegations, the Court held that a private plaintiff may not maintain
an aiding and abetting suit under Section 10(b).4 '
The Court indicated that the scope of conduct prohibited by
Section 10(b) is controlled by the text of the statute.49 The
language of Section 10(b) simply prohibits the use of manipulative
or deceptive acts in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities." Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority, stating that
the Court has refused to allow Rule 10b-5 challenges to conduct
not prohibited by the text of the statute.5 Thus, the aiding and
abetting suit must fail because the allegations of fraud were not in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities.
The Central Bank of Denver Court looked to Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder52 for support of a strict statutory construction of
Section 10(b). In Ernst & Ernst, the Court required scienter as
opposed to mere negligence because the statutory language of
Section 10(b) strongly suggested that the conduct intended to be
proscribed was knowing or intentional.53 The Court added that if
it was to require only negligence, it would "add a gloss to the
operative language of the statute quite different from its commonly
accepted meaning." '54 Therefore, only a strict interpretation that
44. Id. at 167-68.
45. Id. at 168.
46. Id.
47. Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 168.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 173.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 173-74.
52. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
53. "Section 10(b) makes unlawful the use or employment of 'any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance' in contravention of Commission rules. The words
'manipulative and deceptive' used in conjunction with 'device or contrivance' strongly
suggests that § 10(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional conduct." Id. at 197.
54. Id. at 199.
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would not add to the commonly accepted meaning is permissible in
determining violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Next in the line of statutory interpretation of Section 10(b) was
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green.55 Santa Fe Industries relied
heavily on Ernst & Ernst for its interpretation of Section 10(b). In
Santa Fe Industries, the Court considered the issue of whether
Section 10(b) was implicated by a breach of a fiduciary duty of a
majority shareholder against a minority shareholder absent a claim
of misrepresentation or nondisclosure.56 The Court held that the
"language of Section 10(b) gives no indication that Congress meant
to prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or decep-
tion."57
Then, in United States v. Chiarella,5" the Court relied on Ernst
& Ernst and Santa Fe Industries when it held that Section 10(b) is
not violated when a person trades securities with inside information
"unless that trader has an independent duty of disclosure."59 The
Chiarella Court stated that "not every instance of financial
unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under Section 10(b); °
and for there to be a fraudulent activity prohibited by Section 10(b)
based on nondisclosure, there must have been a duty to speak."
6
l
The Central Bank of Denver Court reiterated the conclusion
that Section 10(b) "prohibits only the making of a material
misstatement (or omission) or the commission of a manipulative
act."62 In addition, Section 10(b) requires that the making of a
material misstatement or omission or commission of a manipulative
act be in connection with a securities transaction.' A guideline
for the interpretation of Section 10(b) is of particular importance
when dealing with the misappropriation theory because of its
genesis in Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Furthermore, the validity
55. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
56. Id. at 470.
57. Id. at 473.
58. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
59. Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 174 (citing Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)). An
independent duty to disclose would arise "when one party has information 'that the other
[party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relationship of trust and
confidence between them."' Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 551 (2)(a) (1976)).
60. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232 (citing Santa Fe Industries, 430 U.S. at 474-77 (1977)).
61. Id.
62. Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 177.
63. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1934).
1997].
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of the misappropriation theory must be measured against the
Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 10(b) because its very
existence seems to stretch at the boundaries of statutory interpreta-
tion.
C. The Inception and Development of the Misappropriation
Theory
1. Origin of the misappropriation theory.-The inception of
the misappropriation theory has often been attributed to Chief
Justice Burger's dissent in Chiarella.6  Chiarella involved a
financial printer who was able to deduce the names of target
companies from announcements of takeover bids that were
delivered to the printer, Chiarella's employer, with the expectation
of prepublication confidentiality. 65  Without disclosure of this
material nonpublic information, Chiarella bought stock in these
target companies and sold the stock shortly after the takeover.
66
Chiarella netted about $30,000 in fourteen months using this
scheme.67 The Court held that this conduct did not violate
Section 10(b) because Chiarella owed no duty to disclose the
material information to those with whom he traded.' Therefore,
the conviction was improper. The Court did not consider the issue
of whether there could be liability premised on the misappro-
priation theory because that theory of liability was not presented
to the jury.69 In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger stated that he
would read Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 "to mean that a person
who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute
duty to disclose that information or refrain from trading."7
2. Development in the second circuit.-From Chief Justice
Burger's dissent, the second circuit explicitly adopted the misappro-
priation theory in United States v. Newman7 and has defined the
boundaries of the doctrine through succeeding cases.72 Newman
64. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 239 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 224.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 225-35.
69. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 236.
70. Id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
71. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), affd after remand, 722 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1983).
72. United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Chestman 947
F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984); Moss v. Morgan
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authorized liability under the misappropriation theory for a
violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when one misappropri-
ates confidential information, whether by theft, conversion or
breach of trust, and uses this information without disclosure in
connection with a securities transaction.73 In Newman investment
firm employees misappropriated material nonpublic information
about proposed mergers and acquisitions that was entrusted to their
employers by clients. Newman, along with two others, used this
misappropriated information to purchase securities in the target
corporations. 74 Newman and his conspirators profited substan-
tially from these transactions. 75 Newman was found to have
violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The court found the misap-
propriation theory applicable because the requisite fraud was
Newman's breach of a fiduciary duty to his employer from whom
the information was misappropriated, 76 and that this material
nonpublic information was used in connection with a securities
transaction.
After the misappropriation theory lingered in the second
circuit for almost ten years, it was further refined and restated by
in United States v. Chestman.' The second circuit, sitting en banc,
stated that: "a person violates Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when
he misappropriates material nonpublic information in the breach of
a fiduciary duty or similar relationship of trust and confidence and
uses that information in a securities transaction.,
7
1
In Chestman, a stockbroker was convicted for trading on
misappropriated information.79 The information was acquired by
a client who had been informed by his wife that her family business
was the subject of a proposed tender offer.' The wife informed
the husband not to tell anyone about the tender offer." Against
his wife's wishes, the husband informed his stock broker who
purchased stock in the wife's family business for the husband and
Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983).
73. Newman, 664 F.2d at 18.
74. Id. at 15.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 16.
77. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
78. Id. at 566.





for his own accounts.' The broker was convicted by a jury for
violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.s3 The court of appeals
reversed and the second circuit, sitting en banc, held that there was
no fiduciary or similar relationship of trust and confidence between
the husband and his wife's family that would impose liability under
Rule 10b-5 upon the husband's broker.' Although Chestman
represents the second circuit's own struggle with the difficulty of
applying the misappropriation theory, other circuits followed the
second circuit's lead.
3. Development in the other circuits.-Following the lead set
by the second circuit in Newman, the third circuit intimated a
willingness to follow the misappropriation theory in Rothberg v.
Rosenbloom."5 Rothberg involved investors who were also board
members or directors of certain companies who purchased stocks
based on material nonpublic information. 6 In two instances
Rothberg purchased shares in a publicly known target company
without disclosing material nonpublic information before purchas-
ing.' Rothberg was convicted of violating Section 10(b).8 The
trial court found that liability was established under Section 10(b)
because of Rothberg's breach of duty to his own corporation,
thereby establishes a violation under the definition in Newman.89
The third circuit affirmed.9° Other circuits followed a few years
later.
The next circuit to embrace the misappropriation theory was
the ninth circuit in 1990. In SEC v. Clark,9 the ninth circuit
adopted the misappropriation theory as developed by the second
82. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 555.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 571.
85. Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 808
F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1986). In Rothberg, the court does not explicitly mention the misappro-
priation theory but makes a brief reference to Newman. See id. at 822.
86. Id. at 819-22.
87. In one instance Mr. Rothberg had material nonpublic information pertaining to the
target company's substantially increased orders for the year. In the other instance, Rothberg
had material nonpublic information, which turned out to be incorrect, that upon the merger
the target company's board would be sympathetic to Mr. Rothberg. See id.
88. Id. at 819.
89. Id. at 822.
90. Id. At 823.
91. 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990).
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circuit.92 Clark was a member of a medical supply company's
acquisition team.93 In this capacity, Clark knew of a proposed
takeover and directed his stockbroker to purchase two thousand
shares of the target company.94 From these purchases Clark
realized over $47,000, and his broker realized over $7,500.95 A
jury found that Clark violated Rule 10b-5 by misappropriating and
trading on material nonpublic information.96 On appeal the Clark
court stated that "the misappropriation theory fits comfortably
within the meaning of fraud within Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
as long as the fraud is connected with the purchase or sale of any
security."'97 The court of appeals further held that Clark, the
employee, could be required to disgorge the profits of his stock-
broker who also traded without disclosure of the material nonpub-
lic information provided by Clark, even though the stockbroker was
not found by the jury to have violated any of the federal securities
laws.9"
The following year, the seventh circuit relied on Clark,
Rothberg, and Newman as support for the adoption of the misap-
propriation theory in SEC v. Cherif.99 Cherif was an employee of
First National Bank of Chicago.1" When his position was elimi-
nated due to reorganization, Cherif kept his magnetic access card
which he managed to keep activated. 11 In knowing violation of
an "integrity policy" Cherif had signed while still an employee, he
misappropriated material nonpublic information about proposed
tender offers after his employment was terminated."°  Cherif
made substantial profits while trading on the misappropriated
92. The Clark court cited to Newman, 664 F.2d 12, and to Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir.
1984), in support of adopting the misappropriation theory. Clark, 915 F.2d 439.
93. Clark, 915 F.2d at 441.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 442.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 440.
98. Clark, 915 F.2d at 440.
99. 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991). More recently, the seventh circuit has reaffirmed its
adherence to the misappropriation theory in SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 636 (7th Cir. 1995).
100. Cherif, 933 F.2d at 406.
101. Mr. Cherif managed to keep his magnetic access card activated after he was
discharged from employment by forging a memorandum signed by a Senior Vice President.





nonpublic information." In finding that Cherif had violated
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the court asserted that a person
violates Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when a person trades on
material nonpublic information that was misappropriated in a
breach of a fiduciary relationship such as employment.'
The second, third, seventh, and ninth circuits have all adopted
the misappropriation theory in substantially the same form.15
Each circuit that has adopted the misappropriation theory has
accepted the rationale of Newman and each circuit has built on the
precedent created by the others. As it stands through these
opinions, one violates Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when one
misappropriates material nonpublic information in the breach of a
fiduciary duty or similar relationship of trust or confidence and uses
that information in connection with a securities transaction.10 6
4. The Supreme Court and the misappropriation theory.-The
Supreme Court has yet to directly rule on the misappropriation
theory.1"7 However, the Court has been presented with issues
peripheral to the misappropriation theory, °" and from examining
these decisions, the Court's likely disposition regarding the
misappropriation theory can be inferred.
In Chiarella, where the facts of that case would now result in
a finding of liability for a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
in the circuits, the Court did not address the doctrine because the
theory was not presented to the jury."° The Court also stated
that one does not violate Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 simply by
trading on superior information. 0 The Court reiterated the
traditional view of insider trading that there is no necessity to
disclose material nonpublic information absent a duty to disclose
arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties
to the transaction.1
103. Id. at 407.
104. Id. at 407.
105. See id.; Clark, 915 F.2d 439; Rothberg, 771 F.2d 818; Newman, 664 F.2d 12.
106. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 566.
107. See supra note 16.
108. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646
(1983); Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222.
109. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 236.
110. Id. at 232.
111. Id. at 228.
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Similarly in SEC v. Dirks,"' the Court rejected a parity of
information rule, 3 whereby each trader would have to trade on
equivalent knowledge or disclose. The Court also established, in
dicta, the process through which an outsider achieves temporary
insider status conferring upon that person a fiduciary duty to the
corporation's shareholders."4  This "quasi-insider" rule estab-
lished in Dirks would resolve some of the early misappropriation
theory cases on that ground. Liability would no longer be based on
the misappropriation theory, but upon the traditional theory of
insider trading. This "quasi-insider" rule would impose temporary
insider status on those persons such as accountants and lawyers,
etc., who by way of their temporary employment by a corporation
share a fiduciary duty towards the shareholders of that corporation.
In Dirks, the SEC brought an action against Dirks, an officer
of a New York broker-dealer firm, who was advised by a former
officer of Equity Funding of America that the company had
fraudulently overstated its assets."' Dirks investigated these
allegations and other employees corroborated the alleged fraud."
6
Neither Dirks nor his firm owned any Equity Funding stock, but
Dirks freely discussed his findings with investors and clients."7
Some of the clients sold their Equity Funding holdings in cumula-
tive amounts in excess of $16 million."1 During this period
Equity Funding's stock fell from $26 per share to approximately
$15 per share."9 After a hearing before an administrative law
judge, the SEC found that Dirks violated Section 17(a) of the 1933
Act, Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and Rule 10b-5 by repeating
the allegations of fraud to investors who later sold their Equity
Funding stock. The court of appeals affirmed. 12° The Supreme
Court reversed. 121 The Court reasoned that a duty to disclose
arises from a relationship between the parties and not because of
112. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
113. Id. at 655.
114. Id. at 665 n.14.
115. Id. at 649.
116. Id.
117. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 649.
118. lit
119. Id.
120. Id. at 650-51.
121. Id. at 652.
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one's ability to acquire information simply because of his place in
the market.122
The Court was finally presented with a chance to rule on the
misappropriation theory in Carpenter v. United States.'2  How-
ever, the Court was equally divided and thereby affirmed the
securities convictions of Carpenter.124 In Carpenter, the peti-
tioner, Winans, was a coauthor of an investment advice column for
the Wall Street Journal. Due to the perceived "quality and
integrity" of the column, the contents of Winans' articles impacted
the market prices of the stocks that it discussed." 5 The Wall
Street Journal had a rule that the column's contents were its
confidential information prior to publication." 6 Winans misappro-
priated this confidential information in violation of his duty to the
Wall Street Journal and bought and sold stocks based on the
column's probable impact."2 Winans traded on the prepublica-
tion confidential information from twenty seven of his columns
over a four month period and realized net profits of about
$690,000. 2' Petitioners were indicted for violations of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, mail fraud, and wire fraud.29 The district
court found that Winans' misappropriation of prepublication
information from the Journal was a breach of confidence and the
scheme was a fraud and deceit upon the Journal, and the court of
appeals affirmed these findings.la The Supreme Court upheld
the mail and wire fraud convictions but was evenly divided with
respect to the securities law convictions based upon the misappro-
priation theory; for that reason the judgment of the lower court was
affirmed.' 3'
The Supreme Court has averted a direct ruling on the viability
of the misappropriation theory. First, in Chiarella, the Court was
able to side step ruling on the misappropriation theory because of
the fact that the theory was not presented to the jury.132  In
122. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657-58 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231-32 n.14).
123. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
124. Id. at 24.
125. Id. at 22.
126. Id. at 23.
127. 1d
128. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 23.
129. Id-
130. Id. at 23-24.
131. Id. at 24.
132. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 236.
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Dirks, the Court extended the traditional theory of insider trading
by labeling certain persons as "quasi-insiders. ' 13 3  This in turn
established a fiduciary duty between these persons and the
shareholders of the corporation. This extension would cover
certain cases that prior to Dirks might have been brought under the
misappropriation theory. Before Dirks there would have been no
fiduciary duty owed to the shareholders by the now "quasi-insider"
employee; therefore, the only underlying breach of a fiduciary duty
or similar relationship of trust and confidence would be between
the now "quasi-insider" and his or her employer. Finally, in
Carpenter, an evenly divided Court demonstrated the Court's
internal struggle with the question of the validity of the misappro-
priation theory."3
5. The fourth circuit rejects the misappropriation theory.-In
United States v. Bryan,35 the Court of Appeals for Fourth Circuit
held that the misappropriation theory of liability has no foundation
in law and is not a viable theory of liability.136 This split in the
circuits leads to the thrust of this Comment; that the misappro-
priation theory is an invalid extension of Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 and liability should no longer be premised on this theory.
6. The eighth circuit rejects the misappropriation theory.-In
United States v. O'Hagan,37 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
adopted the totality of the reasoning of the Bryan court. 13  In
O'Hagan, James O'Hagan was a partner in a Minneapolis law firm
that was retained to represent Grand Met PLC (Grand Met) in July
of 1998 as local counsel in Grand Met's attempt to acquire the
Pillsbury Company (Pillsbury). 3 9
133. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 665 n.14.
134. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 24. "An affirmance by an equally divided court is 'not
entitled to precedential weight."' Chestman, 947 F.2d at 566 n.3. (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409
U.S. 188, 192 (1972)).
135. 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
136. Idi at 944.
137. 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996).
138. It is beyond the scope of this comment to determine if O'Hagan was correctly
decided. O'Hagan seems to ignore the "quasi-fiduciary" rule espoused in Dirks whereby
liability can be premised on the "classical theory". It seems that liability could have been
successfully established based upon such a proposition because of Mr. O'Hagan's
employment by Grand Met. However, such debate shall be saved for another day. This
comment seeks to use O'Hagan for the sole purpose of demonstrating the widening rift
between the circuits with regard to blind acceptance of the misappropriation theory.
139. O'Hagan, 92 F.2d at 614.
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Based on his knowledge of Grand Met's plan, Mr. O'Hagan
began purchasing call options for Pillsbury stock."l By the time
Grand Met publicly announced its tender offer, Mr. O'Hagan had
accumulated over 2,500 Pillsbury call options141 and held 5,000
shares of Pillsbury common stock which he purchased in September
1988.142
Thereafter, on October 4,1998, Grand Met publicly announced
its tender offer for Pillsbury stock.143 The value of the Pillsbury
stock skyrocketed from $39 per share to approximately $60 per
share.1" Mr. O'Hagan began exercising his call options, purchas-
ing the Pillsbury stock at the lower option price.145 Mr. O'Hagan
then liquidated all his Pillsbury stock and realized a profit of over
$4,000,000.1" The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that
Mr. O'Hagan's securities fraud convictions based on a violation of
Rule 10b-5 could not stand based upon the misappropriation
theory, 47 and that O'Hagan's mail fraud and money laundering
convictions based upon the securities fraud convictions would be
reversed.1 48 The eighth circuit adopted the Bryan court's analysis
in establishing that the misappropriation theory is an invalid
extension of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 149
III. Analysis
A. United States v. Bryan: Rejection of the Misappropriation
Theory
1. Background and facts.-In Bryan, the fourth circuit
rejected the misappropriation theory of liability for violations of
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.1" The court of appeals specifically
140. Id.
141. Each call option entitled Mr. O'Hagan to purchase 100 shares of Pillsbury stock at
a specific price.





147. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 622.
148. Id. at 627-28.
149. Id. at 620.
150. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 944 (4th Cir. 1995).
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rejected the misappropriation theory as adopted by the second,
third, seventh, and ninth Circuits.'5'
Elton "Butch" Bryan was a director of the West Virginia
Lottery, and in September of 1993 he was found guilty of two
counts of mail fraud, one count of wire fraud, and one count of
securities fraud in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).152 This case
arose out of Bryan's fraudulent manipulation of two government
contracts and from his use of confidential nonpublic information in
the purchase of securities of companies doing business with the
West Virginia Lottery.5
The securities fraud convictions against Bryan stemmed from
a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5."5 The United States
proceeded against Bryan based on the misappropriation theory
which, although embraced by other circuits, 5 was an issue of first
impression in the Fourth Circuit.
2. Discussion of the misappropriation theory.-The Bryan
court refused to blindly follow fourteen years of precedent
developed in other circuit courts. 56 The court concluded that
nothing in the statutory language of Section 10(b) or in Rule 10b-5
or in Supreme Court authority interpreting those provisions
supports the misappropriation theory.'57  In arriving at this
conclusion the Bryan court stated that Section 10(b) "prohibits only
the use of deception, in the form of material misrepresentations
and omissions, to induce action or inaction by purchasers or sellers
of securities, or that affects others with a vested interest in a
securities transaction.' 5 8
The Bryan court went on to discuss and distinguish the
misappropriation theory. The court stated that the misappropria-
151. Id.
152. Id. at 936.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 943.
155. See supra note 105.
156. In 1981, the Newman case set forth the misappropriation theory. See United States
v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 15-19 (2d Cir. 1981). In 1991, Circuit Judge Winter commented on
Section 10(b) and the misappropriation theory: "[n]evertheless, the law is far enough down
this road-indeed, the Insiders Trading Sanctions Act seems premised on 10(b)'s applicabili-
ty-that a court of appeals has no option but to continue the route." United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 578 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).




tion theory creates liability for breaches of fiduciary duty or a
similar relationship of trust and confidence."' This liability
attaches "whether or not the breaches entail deception within the
meaning of Section 10(b), and whether or not the parties wronged
by the breaches were purchasers or sellers of securities or otherwise
connected with or interested in the purchase or sale of securi-
ties.'" The Bryan court further stated that courts have required
four components in establishing criminal liability under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 61 Criminal liability is established when a
person
(1) misappropriates material nonpublic information (2) by
breaching a duty arising out of a relationship of trust and
confidence and (3) uses that information in a securities transac-
tion, (4) regardless of whether he owed any duties to the
shareholders of the traded stock.162
The misappropriation theory extends liability by allowing the
"fraud" requirement of Rule lOb-5 to be satisfied by the misappro-
priation of nonpublic material information in the breach of a
fiduciary duty or similar relationship."6 The source of the
misappropriated information need not be a buyer or seller of
securities, a person affiliated with a buyer or seller of securities, or
connected or interested in the sale of securities.1" The theory
has been characterized as "fraud on the source" liability."6 The
misappropriation theory relies on the fraud against, and breach of
duty, toward any person that is in any way related to a securities
transaction."6 For example, the requisite fraud under the mis-
appropriation theory is the misappropriation of material nonpublic




162. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 944.
163. For example, in U.S. v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1993), the requisite fraud for
liability under Section 10(b) was the misappropriation of material nonpublic information by
an employee from an employer. There was no breach of a fiduciary or similar duty to a
purchaser or seller of securities. The fraud upon the employer was enough to establish
liability because this information obtained by fraud was later used in a securities transaction.
Id.
164. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 944.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 945.
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or confidence.167 As in Carpenter, the fraud was the misappro-
priation of the confidential information from the "Heard" column
which was the property of the Wall Street Journal prior to
publication.1" Therefore its misappropriation was a theft or
fraud upon the Wall Street Journal. The requisite breach of
fiduciary or similar duty was the breach of the duty Winans owed
to the Journal as an employee. It was not a breach of a duty
Winans owed to those who were parties to the securities transac-
tion. Further, the misappropriation theory merely requires that all
elements be present. They need not be linked in a way that the
fraud is on a party to the securities transaction or that the duty
breached is to one who is a party to the securities transaction. The
misappropriation theory requires a broad reading of Section 10(b).
3. Statutory interpretation of Section 10(b) as most recently
defined by the Supreme Court undermines the misappropriation
theory.-The language of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is extremely
broad. Section 10(b) has been referred to as a "catch-all" provi-
sion.169  The courts that have adopted the misappropriation
theory subscribe to the expansive language of Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5. It is important to note that although the language of
the statute is broad, the Supreme Court has stated that Section
10(b) should be narrowly construed. 7°
Although the Supreme Court has been silent on the misappro-
priation theory, it has commented on Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5.71 Based on the Court's approach to Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5, it is apparent that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 should not
be construed more broadly than the statutory language permits.172
The Bryan court went on to analyze the meaning of "manipu-
lation," "deception," and "fraud," because manipulation and
deception are the criteria of Section 10(b) liability and fraud is a
requirement for Rule 10b-5 liability.73 However, the fraud that
Rule 10b-5 prohibits cannot be greater than that which Section
167. Id. at 944-45.
168. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 23 (1987).
169. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980).
170. See Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164
(1994); Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
171. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222.
172. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 945.
173. Id. at 945-46.
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10(b) prescribes. Because of this caveat, a double screen is created
and liability can be determined only with respect to the terms of
Section 10(b). Any conduct proscribed by Rule 10b-5 but not
necessarily prohibited by Section 10(b) itself cannot create liability
because Rule 10b-5 is limited by Section 10(b). With regard to
manipulation under Section 10(b), the fourth circuit looked to
Santa Fe Industries where the Supreme Court described "manipu-
lation" as a term of art 74 referring to "'practices, such as wash
sales, matched orders, or rigged prices,' that are 'intended to
mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity.""'17 The
Supreme Court has provided that "deception" under Section 10(b)
is limited to the "making of a material misstatement (or omission)
or the commission of a manipulative act."'76
In addition, the Bryan court emphasized that the primary
concern of Section 10(b) is the protection of purchasers and sellers
of securities."77 The Bryan court made this assertion based on the
holding of Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,78 wherein
the Supreme Court recognized that Section 10(b) should be limited
to purchasers and sellers of securities.179 In Blue Chip Stamps,
the Court based its opinion on Section 10(b)'s statutory language
which provides for protection of investors."s
A strict statutory interpretation of Section 10(b) requires that
the fraud provisions become applicable primarily to frauds upon
investors.'18  Using a "fraud on the source" basis to establish
liability under the misappropriation theory would lack this
fundamental principle because the fraud is usually on another who
is not an investor or party to the transaction. Although the courts
have been primarily concerned with investors, they are not the only
ones to be protected by the 1934 Act. In enforcing the provisions
of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the Supreme Court has been
174. Santa Fe Industries, 430 U.S. at 476 (citing Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199).
175. Id. at 476.
176. Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 177.
177. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 947.
178. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
179. Blue Chip Stamps held that only actual purchasers and sellers of securities have an
implied right of action under Rule 10b-5. Id. at 735-36. The Bryan Court acknowledged that
this holding does not apply in the criminal context. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 947 n.10. However,
for the purpose of this comment, the Blue Chip Stamps holding demonstrates the Supreme
Court's restrictive interpretation of Section 10(b) liability.
180. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 733.
181. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1934).
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primarily concerned about "potential purchasers of shares"182 and
"actual shareholders"'" who chose not to buy or sell based on the
material misrepresentations and/or omissions. Additionally, the
Court has looked to protect "shareholders, creditors, and perhaps
others related to the issuer who suffered loss to the value of their
investments due to corporate or insider activities.""t  Further, the
Court has indicated that the 1934 Act was intended to protect stock
brokers because their livelihood is "inextricably linked" to that of
investors. 185
Proceeding with these interpretations of Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, the misappropriation theory falters. Although the
misappropriation of material nonpublic information can be viewed
in general as a "deception," the Court delineated in Central Bank
of Denver that "deception" for Section 10(b) liability is limited to
a misrepresentation or omission of material information."l The
misappropriation theory does not seem to require "deception" but
merely a breach of a fiduciary duty or similar relationship of trust
and confidence. The Bryan court found this interpretation
inconsistent with Santa Fe Industries which stated that "a breach of
fiduciary duty, even in connection with a purchase or sale of
securities, does not give rise to liability under Section 10(b), absent
deception."'" The Bryan court argued that the required decep-
tion must be on a person who is in some way connected to the
securities transaction."s  Without this, the misappropriation
theory diverges from its premise of protecting buyers and sellers of
securities since Section 10(b) does not require equal information to
all investors. Thus, those who trade on information misappropriat-
ed from someone unconnected to the securities transaction violate
no duty to the buyer or seller of securities. It follows that a fraud-
on-the-source theory of liability in quest of parity of information is
untenable." 9
182. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737-38.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 948 (citing United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 799 (1979),
which stated that the purpose of the 1934 Act was to give protection to financial intermediar-
ies through Section 17(a)).
186. Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 177.
187. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 949 (citing Santa Fe Industries, 430 U.S. at 473-74).




4. The demands of certainty and predictability.-"The
demands for certainty and predictability" in the securities market
have been emphasized by the Supreme Court.tg The quagmire
created by Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 creates confusion.
Without a bright-line rule investors and brokers are unable to
accurately predict if their conduct will be prohibited by Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
The problem with the breach of a fiduciary duty or a similar
relationship of trust and confidence being the cornerstone of the
misappropriation theory is the uncertainty of determining what
duties arise from each particular relationship. For instance the
misappropriation theory has been the basis of liability for the
following relationships: between and employer and employee,
191
between an employer and an employee's tippees,' 9 between a
newspaper and its reporters, 9 3 between an employer and former
employee,1 94 between a psychiatrist and his patient,9 5 between
a husband and a wife,196 between a father and son,"9 and, as in
this case, between a governmental official and his constituency.1 9
The breadth of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 has created, and
will continue to create, great confusion with regard to the breach
of fiduciary duty or similar relationship of trust and confidence.
The determination of what is a similar relationship of trust and
confidence is subject to varying outcomes under similar circum-
stance depending upon the particular court or judge. Such
uncertainty gives no guidance and insufficient notice that certain
acts may be in violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Certainty
would require a federal standard applicable to these relationships.
The Bryan Court suggested that the only way to have a bright-
line theory would be to federalize the relationships that have
traditionally been left to state common statutory law.'99 Ho-
190. See Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 189-90.
191. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981).
192. Id.
193. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), affd by an equally divided
court, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
194. SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 411 (7th Cir. 1991).
195. United States v. Willis, 737 F.Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
196. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 564 (2d Cir. 1991).
197. United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 773
F. Supp. 477 (2d Cir. 1985).
198. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 951.
199. Id. at 951-52.
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wever, this would fly in the face of the Supreme Court's admoni-
tion not to federalize state laws for the need of regulating federal
securities transactions."
5. The meaning of fraud in the securities context.-Although
fraud consists of many practices, some of which encompass the
misappropriation of material nonpublic information in the breach
of a fiduciary duty, the Supreme Court has been clear that fraud,
as used in the terms of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, must be
construed in the context of the 1933 and 1934 Acts." Thus,
there must not only be a fraud, but the fraud must also be
manipulative or deceptive as encompassed Section 10(b). As the
Court discussed in Ernst & Ernst, the word "manipulative" means
"intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud
investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of
securities."'  Clearly, the misappropriation of information is not
conduct that controls or artificially controls securities prices. The
Court in Central Bank of Denver defined deceptive as the making
of a material misstatement or omission.' Again, the use of
misappropriated material nonpublic information in a securities
transaction is not a misstatement and is not an omission absent a
duty to speak.2' 4 Further, if there was a duty to speak, liability
could be brought under the traditional theory.2 5
B. Tenuousness of the Misappropriation Theory
In sum, the misappropriation theory is a tenuous extension of
Section 10(b). Rule 10b-5 can not exceed the will of Congress as
encompassed in Section 10(b).' Therefore, the misappropriation
theory must fail because the fraud is not encompassed by the
definitions of "deceptive" or "manipulative" as included in the 1933
and 1934 Acts.
200. Id. at 952.
201. Santa Fe Industries, 430 U.S. at 472.
202. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976).
203. Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 190-92.
204. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222.
205. See supra note 10.
206. See supra note 7.
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C Rejection of the Misappropriation Theory Will Not Adversely
Affect the Marketplace
The rejection of the misappropriation theory will not cause
investors to lose confidence in the market. Much of the conduct
that is criminalized under the misappropriation theory is also
criminalized under Section 10(b), the mail and wire fraud stat-
utes,' °7 and in 18 U.S.C. § 1346. °  These provisions effectuate
the purposes of the 1933 and 1934 Acts without encompassing
conduct not intended to be prohibited. The final disposition of
Carpenter demonstrates this. In Carpenter, the Court upheld the
mail and wire fraud convictions, but was evenly divided as to the
securities fraud conviction brought under the misappropriation
theory.
D. The Trend Towards Conservative Reading of Federal
Securities Regulations
The Court has been continually receding from the liberal
interpretations of federal securities regulations. In particular,
Justice Powell's conservative interpretations as evidenced in Ernst
& Ernst, Chiarella, and Dirks have successively restricted the
statutory interpretation of Section 10(b). Today, in view of the
recent Central Bank of Denver decision, the Supreme Court will
most likely continue down the ever narrowing path and find that
the misappropriation theory is inconsistent with Section 10(b). The
Court would most likely favor only the traditional theory or
classical theory of insider trader liability purposefully encompassed
in Section 10(b). The Court will probably find that the misappro-
priation theory of "fraud-on-the-source" liability is not within the
purview of Section 10(b).
With the Supreme Court's strict statutory interpretation of
Section 10(b), the reasoning of the Bryan court's refusal to follow
established securities law precedent in the other circuits is apparent.
The resulting conclusion is that the misappropriation theory is a
207. The mail fraud statute is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994). The wire fraud statute
is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994). The SEC has no jurisdiction over these offenses.
Enforcement of these provisions would be by the United States Attorney's Office.
208. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988) prohibits "a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the
intangible right to honest services." Again, the SEC has no jurisdiction over these




judicial creation that amends the statutory language of Section
10(b) to extend liability in unintended circumstances. The statute
should not be amended through judicial interpretation to extend
liability to acts that are not manipulative or deceptive.
E. Proposal
1. Importance of certainty. -Certainty, being a principle of
essential value in both securities and criminal law, is achieved by
a clear, bright line rule upon which actions may be judged.' 9
Rule 10b-5 is anything but certain; as a "catch-all" provision,21
Rule 10b-5 has the capacity to bring within its grasp whatever
deceptive, manipulative, or fraudulent scheme that may arise.
211
It is blanket legislation designed to cover all acts or omissions that
fall within the broad scope of Section 10(b)'s prohibitions.
The inherent result of this vagueness is the various interpre-
tations resulting from the subjective beliefs and desires of the
particular judicial bench considering the case.212 A decision
consistent with Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 could go either way
depending on the particular court's aptitude with rhetoric.
The "rule of lenity" and the canon of strict statutory construc-
tion of penal statutes are two interrelated, long-standing bulwarks
of due process. The "rule of lenity" requires that any ambiguities
resulting from the interpretation of a criminal statute should be
resolved in favor of lenity.2 3  The canon of strict statutory
209. "[A] judicial holding that certain undefined activities 'generally are prohibited' by
Section 10(b) would raise questions whether either criminal or civil defendants would be
given fair notice that they have engaged in an illegal activity." Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235
n.20.
210. Id at 235.
211. See supra note 30.
212. When the statute and rule are, like Section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, virtually as vague
as the Due Process Clause, the law is surely as much judge-made as is the classic common
law of the states." LOUIS LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIEs REGULATION 728 (2d ed.
1988).
213. According to the Supreme Court:
[Wihen assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute, we must pay close heed
to language, legislative history, and purpose in order to strictly determine the
scope of the conduct the enactment forbids. Due respect for the prerogatives of
Congress in defining federal crimes prompts restraint in this area, where we
typically find a 'narrow interpretation' appropriate.
Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207,213 (1985) (citing Williams v. United States, 458 U.S.
279, 290 (1982)).
The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old
than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights
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construction is similar to the "rule of lenity", but this doctrine does
not require the statute to be criminal, merely penal.214
Both doctrines are important because the civil enforcements
brought under the misappropriation theory are not criminal and the
"rule of lenity" would therefore be inapplicable. However, the
canon of strict statutory construction would be applicable because
some civil enforcements cannot be considered merely remedial.
Some are inherently penal.
These doctrines would invalidate the misappropriation theory
because its boundaries are undefined and ever-expanding. The
misappropriation theory of liability under Section 10(b) does not
provide fair notice of what conduct is proscribed.
In particular, with penal sanctions it would be of paramount
importance to be able to unequivocally determine whether one's
proposed course of conduct is proscribed. The general prohibitions
of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 leaves one with nothing more than
a subjective opinion as to how a particular court will rule. Whether
one will be convicted of a criminal violation may simply depend on
the court and the novelty of the situation. When a person's
freedom is at stake, he or she, at the very least, deserves adequate
notice of what conduct is prohibited. A vague statute and rule is
of no value in determining proposed courses of action.
The securities markets demand certainty. In fact, the Securi-
ties Act of 1933215 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934216
were designed to regulate the securities markets and provide
certainty to investors. Again, the vagueness of Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 leads to tenuous extensions of civil and criminal liability
based on the misappropriation theory.217 Investors and brokers
are given no clear guidance, only general prohibitions. They are
left to chance civil or criminal liability based on their own evalua-
of the individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is
vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department. It is the legislature, not
the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.
Id. at 213-14 (quoting United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat 76, 95 (1820)).
214. "Penal laws, strictly and properly, are those imposing punishment for an offense
committed against the state.. . . The test is whether a law is penal, in the strict and primary
sense, is whether the wrong sought to be redressed is a wrong to the public, or a wrong to
the individual .. " Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 667-68 (1892).
215. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb.
216. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811.
217. See generally United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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tions of the proposed conduct. This uncertainty leaves the
marketplace less efficient than it would be with specific provisions.
2. The proposed amended Rule 10b-5.-Rule 10b-5 could
easily be clarified and provide reasonable certainty by simply
amending the last two sentences of the rule. The new Rule 10b-5
would be:
Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce,
or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities ex-
change,
(a) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit, upon any
party to the purchase or sale of any security.218
3. Protection of investors and brokers.-This modification of
Rule 10b-5 would protect both brokers and investors. It protects
only those who are a party to the purchase or sale of the securities.
It would not protect such entities as the Wall Street Journal or
Business Week. These entities whose information (property rights)
has been misappropriated could seek criminal and civil relief in the
courts, but not under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 based on the
misappropriation theory. Liability would be premised on the mail
and wire fraud statutes219 and 18 U.S.C. 1346.m
4. Liability solely premised on the traditional theory of insider
trading.-This modification would comport with the traditional
theory of insider trading liability with the corresponding duties to
disclose or abstain.221  For example, if one breaches a fiduciary
duty between the employee and employer, such as in Carpenter,
and there is no corresponding duty to disclose to the purchaser or
seller of securities, then there is no liability under Section 10(b) and
218. Compare with 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976).
219. See supra note 207.
220. See supra note 208.
221. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
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Rule 10b-5. The employee with this informational advantage is not
under a duty to disclose the information before trading, therefore
there is no Section 10(b) liability. This further corresponds with
the Supreme Court's view that there is no parity of information
requirement.'
By limiting the fraud requirement to a fraud on a party to the
purchase or sale of securities, the proposed Rule 10b-5 would be
more in accordance with the requirement of Section 10(b) that the
manipulative or deceptive device be used or employed in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security.' This is less
tenuous than examining a relationship secondary to the purchaser-
seller relationship in order to find a breach of a fiduciary or similar
duty which acts as a fraud upon that person. This requirement that
the person defrauded be a party to the securities transaction would
also eliminate the attenuated interpretation that any fraud upon
any person that is later used in connection with a securities
transaction creates liability under the misappropriation theory.
Inherently, uncertainty will prevail with the existing requirement
that the predicate fraud required can be satisfied by any breach of
a fiduciary or similar relationship. When dealing with differing
relationships, the various courts may have inconsistent views as to
which relationships constitute a fiduciary or similar relationship.
With the proposed revision of Rule 10b-5 the relationship between
the buyer and seller will generally fall within a bright line category
of fiduciary or not such as has been established under traditional
theory of insider trading liability.'
IV. Conclusion
A strict statutory interpretation of Section 10(b) leads to the
conclusion that the misappropriation theory has no basis in law
because it is an invalid extension of Section 10(b) through Rule
10b-5. The misappropriation theory stretches each link in the chain
of liability. It permits liability based on a fraud committed on a
person not involved with a securities transaction if the information
that was misappropriated was eventually used in the purchase or
sale of securities.
222. SEC v. Dirks, 463 U.S. 646, 665 (1983).
223. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1934).
224. See supra note 10.
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The misappropriation theory sacrifices the principle of
certainty that is so desirable in the securities world. Without
certainty of liability, the less efficient the securities market will
function because brokers and investors will both be wary and
deliberate so as not to be sucked into the liability created by the
misappropriation theory.
A simple bright-line of liability would help to solve the current
disenchantment with the misappropriation theory. By limiting the
fraud requirement of Rule 10b-5 to a person who is a party to the
sale or purchase of securities, the analysis would be similar to what
the Supreme Court has already instructed. If there is no duty to
disclose, then there is no fraud, hence no liability. This interpreta-
tion comports with the intent of the 1934 Congress, the Supreme
Court's interpretation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and the
principles of certainty and predictability.
Christopher J. Muzzi

